Negotiation process must address diversity

Page 4

Even when it fails, the constitutional process in Canada manages to educate the general public about the hopes and desires of first nations.

When Red Sucker MLA Elijah Harper uttered his quiet No in the Manitoba legislature and sent the Meech Lake accord into a tailspin, he sent a strong message to

the Canadian public.

That message was: First nations aren't joking around here. Something must be done to address the historic inequalities and racist policies that have governed aboriginal communities since white settlers first came to this land.

It was a lesson well-heeded by federal and provincial politicians when it came time to negotiate a renewed constitution. In an unprecedented move, white leaders broke with their closeted traditions and invited four national aboriginal organizations to participate in the process.

But for all the effort and good intentions, the process failed - dramatically. News reports indicate more than 60 per cent of the status population rejected what national leaders believed was the best deal possible.

Why?

The answer can probably be found in the headlines of the mainstream newspapers. Throughout the 18 months of negotiations, the press reflected the attitude of many Canadians, saying Natives demand this or Natives demand that.

Who are these Natives? To put it simply, they are Ovide Mercredi and the Assembly of First Nations. One organization elected by chiefs, who are themselves the creation of the much-maligned Indian Act.

There is the problem. The process created to deal with the concerns of first nations was only tenuously connected to the multitude of realities that exist in first nations.

Federal and provincial politicians to a greater or lesser degree attempted to have these different realities present at the bargaining table. They invited representatives from the status, non-status, Metis and Inuit organizations.

But they miscalculated how far that representation reached into the community. There was no voice at the table specifically representing treaty nations, prompting opposition to the deal. There was no voice at the table for the women's organizations

who feared constitutional entrenchment of the deal would lead to a form of government dominated by chiefs.

That is perhaps the lesson of this constitutional process. Ottawa cannot hand-pick who it chooses to deal with at the bargaining table. Native communities are diverse. They have different needs, different political traditions and exist at different levels of development. A process must be found to address this diversity in a way that reflects the grassroots.

Hopefully, future constitution makers will better understand this reality as a result of the Charlottetown failure.

And finally, perhaps it is best to look at Charlottetown as case of putting the cart before the horse. If the referendum had gone the other way, there would be no fast changes for Native communities. The big difference would have been a legally-binding agreement to negotiate self-government.

There is nothing in the laws of Canada that no prevent those negotiations from continuing. It is all a matter of political will. If Ottawa and the provinces had the will to entrench self-government, they should hang on to that and continue negotiations at the political level.

One of the problems with Charlottetown - especially in the treaty communities - was too much left up in the air for future negotiations. Trust us, the politicians said. For good reasons, many people in the Native community were not prepared to do that.

Self-government must continue to be advanced at the community level for all aboriginal people, whether status, non-status, Metis or Inuit.

When the ideas start to become reality at the community level, it will be much easier to find the words that will make them part of Canada's fundamental law.